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Pain and Suffering Damages in Wrongful
Death Cases: An Empirical Study
Yun-chien Chang, Theodore Eisenberg, Han-Wei Ho, and Martin T. Wells*
Most jurisdictions in the United States award pain and suffering damages to spouses of
victims in wrongful death cases. In several East Asian countries, spouses, parents, and
children of the victim can all demand pain and suffering damages. Despite the prevalence
of this type of damages, and the oft-enormous amount of compensation, there has been no
large-scale empirical study on how judges achieve the difficult task of assessing pain and
suffering damages. Using a unique data set containing hundreds of car accident cases
rendered by the court of first instance in Taiwan, with single-equation and structural-
equation models, we find the plaintiffs' ad damnum has a statistically significant influence
on the court-adjudicated pain and suffering damages. That could be evidence for the
anchoring effect. Nevertheless, courts are very sensitive to the possibility of pushing defend-
ants into financial hardship. When defendants' out-of-pocket payments of pecuniary
damages, divided by defendants' income, are positive, this amount has a negative effect on
the amount of pain and suffering damages, whereas when they are negative (this could
happen because the amount of compulsory insurance payment had to be deducted), the
amount in absolute value has a positive effect. Not all next-of-kin received the same amount.
Spouses of the victim received more than other next-of-kin, and adult children received the
least among eligible relatives. Parents, however, tended to be awarded a high amount of pain
and suffering damages when they were the only familial group suing the defendant.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Pain and suffering and other noneconomic damages awarded by courts have generated
much normative and policy debate in the United States (see, e.g., Leebron 1989; Croley &
Hanson 1995; Geistfeld 1995, 2005; McCaffery et al. 1995; Vidmar et al. 1998; Niemeyer
2004; Rabin 2005; Sharkey 2005; Avraham 2006; Sugarman 2006; Viscusi 2007) and else-
where (Karapanou & Visscher 2010; Flatscher-Th6ni et al. 2013, 2014). In wrongful death
cases, most states in the United States award spouses of the dead victim pain and suffering
damages for loss of spousal consortium, and a minority of states allow pain and suffering
damages for loss of parental consortium (Bovbjerg et al. 1988:912; Epstein 1999:451-53;
Shapo 2010:486-87). Yet all existing empirical and experimental studies on pain and
suffering damages have focused on personal injury cases.' Therefore, empirical knowledge
regarding how judges or juries quantify the pain of losing a beloved family member is
lacking. This article fills in the gap by empirically examining a unique data set from Taiwan,
constructed by the authors, that contains information on pain and suffering compensation
for loss of parental, spousal, and child consortium, pecuniary damages, and plaintiffs' and
defendants' annual income, among others.
It is important to ascertain whether pain and suffering damages in wrongful death
cases follow a rational pattern. Eric A. Posner and Sunstein (2005:543) state that "[t]here is
every reason to believe that the resulting awards [damages for pain and suffering for the
distress and loss of companionship suffered by dependents or heirs of the dead tort victims]
have a high degree of arbitrariness" (emphasis added). Even Judge Posner (2011:319), who
generally believes in the efficiency of the common law, lists "the method of computing
damages in death cases" as one of the four common-law doctrines that may not have a sound
economic rationale. Moreover, noneconomic damages are a substantial fraction of all
damages (Bovbjerg et al. 1988; Viscusi 1988:207-08; Avraham 2006). Lack of a rational basis
for them would call into question about half or more of tort damages. Pain and suffering
damages also are an instance of unbounded damages, which generate positively skewed
award distributions (Kahneman et al. 1998; Guthrie et al. 2000), which in turn lead to
reform proposals (e.g., Kahneman et al. 1998). Chang et al. (2015), using another unique
data set from Taiwan regarding the pain and suffering compensation in personal injury
cases, find that careerjudges in Taiwan reasonably base many of their difficult decisions on
objective criteria, most notably the amount of medical costs and the level of injury. Com-
pared to awarding pain and suffering compensation in wrongful death cases, ascertaining
the amount for personal injury seems easy. In wrongful death cases, often no pecuniary
'For experimental studies on pain and suffering damages in personal injury cases, see Chapman and Bornstein
(1996), McCaffery et al. (1995), Avraham (2005), and Diamond et al. (1998). Empirical studies on pain and suffering
damages in personal injury cases do not always include death cases (Bovbjerg et al. 1988; Viscusi 1988; Vidmar et al.
1998; Sharkey 2005; Sugarman 2006; Kritzer et al. 2014). The studies (e.g., Leebron 1989) that include death cases
analyze compensation for pain and suffering between the time of injury and the time of death, not compensation for
surVivors.
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damages (except funeral expenses) can be claimed,' and pecuniary damages are, at most,
indirectly related to the emotional distress of the plaintiffs, as the killed person (or his or her
estate) is not the suing party. Judicial decisionmakers are left with the personal character-
istics of the two parties and the dead victim. It is thus interesting to examine whether in such
situations pain and suffering damages for loss of spousal, parental, and children consortium
can be consistent or systematically correlated with certain facets of the cases.
From a comparative viewpoint, whether mourning over the deceased by the next-of-
kin can be compensated appears to exhibit cultural differences between Europe and Asia.
In a survey of tort laws in 10 European countries, Koch and Koziol (2003:429-30) find that
except in shocking cases, spouses and other relatives are not entitled to claim pain and
suffering compensation.' By contrast, in East Asian countries, such as Taiwan,' China,'
Japan,' and South Korea,7 spouses, parents, and children of victims have explicitly recog-
nized rights of demanding pain and suffering damages. In the world spectrum of pain and
suffering damages, the United States is in the middle, as spouses are at least entitled to this
kind of nonpecuniary compensation. The findings of this empirical inquiry could shed light
on howjudicial decisionmakers in the United States and East Asian countries may have (or
would have) quantified the emotional distress of close relatives.
Using randomly sampled car accident cases from Taiwan, we provide three analyses
of pain and suffering damages. First, we assess the effects of personal information about the
two parties and the victim on requested and awarded pain and suffering damages. We find
that high-income plaintiffs requested more pain and suffering damages, whereas victim's
age had a negative impact on the awards each plaintiff received.
Second, most cases have multiple plaintiffs and thus we can examine patterns of
judicial behavior on both the "individual level" and the "case level." Individual level in this
'In our first-round data, courts awarded reimbursement of funeral expenses in 35 percent of the observations, and
compensation for living expenses in 34 percent of the observations.
'Note that Belgium awards pain and suffering damages in wrongful death cases. Courts there use an "indicative" table
that contains a schedule of pain and suffering damages to determine the amount due to plaintiffs. Although the tables
are not mandatory, courts use them, and therefore most parties settle around the suggested amount. We thank Louis
Visscher and Michael Faure for bring this to our attention and providing their first-hand observation. The indicative
table in Dutch can be found at <http://www.ordeexpress.be/UserFiles/ArtikelDocumenten/Indicatieve-tabel
.2012.pdf>.
'Article 194 of Taiwan Civil Code.
'Although Article 20 of China's Tort Law of 2009 only lays down a very general principle regarding pain and suffering
damages, the Supreme People's Court, in one influential 2001 'judicial interpretation," created rights of action for
survivors of the wrongfully killed victim. We were informed that court practices in China vary. In the Shanghai area,
for example, courts award flat pain and suffering damages, while in the Beijing area, a pain and suffering damages
cap was set butjudges have discretion to determine the specific amount of such damages.
'Article 711 ofJapan Civil Code. Injapan, the pain and suffering damages in wrongful death actions are determined
by formulas that are largely based on the role the deceased played in the family. See Ramseyer (forthcoming:Ch. 2)
for a detailed account.
'Article 752 of South Korea Civil Code.
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article refers to the pain and suffering damages requested by and awarded to each individ-
ual plaintiff. Analysis on this level is particularly helpful in examining whether familial
relations with the victim affect the amount of pain and suffering damages. We find that
spouses tended to receive more pain and suffering damages than parents and children;
minor children came next; followed by parents; and adult children tended to receive the
least. Case level in this article refers to the total pain and suffering damages requested by
and awarded to all plaintiffs in one case. Examination on this level is useful in sorting out
whether courts would reduce the amount of pain and suffering awards more than they
otherwise would when the defendant might encounter financial problems due to the heavy
compensation obligation. Indeed, we find that when the amount of pecuniary damages
paid by the defendants personally divided by defendants' income is positive, it is negatively
statistically significant on both the case level and the individual level. This result, along with
the signs and statistical significance of other variables, suggests thatjudges tend to keep the
(total) amount of compensation in check, so as not to put too much financial burden on
the defendants.
Third, our data include the amount of pain and suffering damages requested by the
plaintiff. This allows us to assess whether, holding constant the exogenous influences on
pain and suffering damages, the amount the plaintiff requests is associated with the amount
the judge awards. If the requested amount independently influenced the awarded amount,
that is evidence that anchoring was at work. Since the defendant almost never countered a
pain and suffering damages amount to the court, the expected direction of the anchoring
effect is reasonably clear. As the plaintiffs' requests for pain and suffering damages
increased, the anchoring theory would forecast that the judge awarded more in such
damages. In Chang et al. (2015), we found evidence for such an anchoring effect. In this
study, we again find that the plaintiffs request, holding constant other variables, has a
statistically significant effect on the pain and suffering awards.
Section II of this article describes Taiwan's law relating to pain and suffering
damages. Section III addresses our hypotheses and methodology. Section IV reports and
discusses our results. Section V concludes.
11. TAIWAN'S PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGES LAW
Pursuant to Articles 1928 and 194' of the Taiwan Civil Code, spouse,o children, and parents
of wrongfully killed victims can claim both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages. More
8Article 192 of Taiwan Civil Code stipulates that "(I) [a] person who has wrongfully caused the death of another shall
also be bound to make compensation for the injury to any person incurring the medical expenses, increasing the
need in living, or incurring the funeral expenses. (Il) If the deceased was statutorily bound to furnish maintenance
to a third party, the tortfeasor shall also make compensation to such third party for any injury arising therefrom. (Ill)
The provision of the second paragraph of Article 193 shall apply to the compensation of the preceding paragraph."
'Article 194 of Taiwan Civil Code stipulates that "[i]n case of death caused by a wrongful act, the father, mother, sons,
daughters and spouse of the deceased may claim for a reasonable compensation in money even if such injury is not
a purely pecuniary loss."
'oA "significant other" who was not legally married to the deceased does not have a right of action.
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specifically, the pecuniary damages include (1) the medical expenses incurred before
death; (2) the funeral expenses (within a reasonable range); and (3) living expenses for
children of the victim who are less than 20 years old and for parents and spouse of the
victim who cannot financially sustain themselves. As Taiwan has a mandatory national
health-care system, a large portion of the medical expenses are covered by the state; only
co-payments and medical treatments not covered by the national health-care system were
paid by the victim, and the tortfeasor is responsible for such payments. The calculation of
living expenses is formulaic.
As for nonpecuniary damages, the father, mother, spouse, sons, and daughters
(in-laws not included) of the victim can claim compensation for their pain and suffering
due to losing a beloved one." Legal scholars in Taiwan, like those in Germany, hold the
view that the major functions of pain and suffering damages are to compensate victims for
their losses and to use money to ease their sorrow. The deterrence effect of pain and
suffering damages is also mentioned. In the specific context of wrongful death, following
the aforementioned mainstream view, this nonpecuniary compensation received by next-
of-kin is to compensate the victim's close relatives for their psychological losses and to
reduce their sorrow by giving them money. Courts in Taiwan, however, never explicitly
discussed the function of pain and suffering damages in wrongful death cases.
It is important to note that pecuniary damages and nonpecuniary damages here are
unlikely to be jointly determined. Pecuniary damages are evidence or formula based, and
not all cases involve a claim of pecuniary damages. By contrast, the assessment of
nonpecuniary damages is subjective, as elaborated below. In practice, courts determine the
amount of pecuniary damages (item by item) first, and then determine the more discre-
tionary nonpecuniary damages. From all existing evidence, judges in Taiwan, when han-
dling these pain and suffering damages cases, did not determine the amount of
compensation holistically.
No formula exists for courts to determine the amount of pain and suffering damages.
The Civil Code provides no guidance. A few leading cases rendered by the Supreme Court
of Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s declared that the following factors should be considered:
socioeconomic status, total assets, annual income, age, educational background, and so
forth for both sides, the plaintiffs level of pain and harm, the victim's negligence, the
defendant's repentance, and so on. Other than this, to date, there is no conventional
wisdom or rules of thumb for quantifying pain and suffering. In practice, the plaintiff
generally simply claims an amount and contends that it is just, with little supporting
evidence. The court decisions usually start with a template discussion that carbon-copies the
list of factors emphasized by the leading cases,' 2 then summarize the facts of the case at
"After injury and before death, victims suffer from pain. Their claim for pain and suffering can be inherited only if
the defendant has agreed to pay for it, or if the victim had sued the defendant before his death. In both cases, the
compensation obligation may affect courts' decision on the pain and suffering damages we study here. Nonetheless,
we find that this stipulation has been rarely used in practice, and we have no evidence of its use in the cases we
sampled; thus, we ignore this stipulation in the following regression models.
"Not all courts use the same template. The factors that a court explicitly claims to take into account slightly differ.
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hand, and at the end award an amount. As judges have never elaborated their formulas and
rarely provided concrete information regarding the factors," it is doubtful to what extent
those factors listed in the template arguments affect the final amount of pain and suffering
damages.
Plaintiffs are required to make an ad damnum and do not have an incentive to claim
unrealistically high amounts of pain and suffering damages. First, the court fee is propor-
tionate to the amount of claimed total damages (roughly, around 1 percent of the total
claimed damages)." Second, the losing party has to pay the court fee. In a tort lawsuit, the
plaintiff has to pay part of the court fee if the court does not grant all claims. The plaintiff
generally has to pay [1 - (court award/plaintiffs claim)] x court fee. So claiming a high
amount of pain and suffering damages increases both the court fee and the probability of
bearing the cost of a higher percentage of the court fee.
The compulsory automobile liability insurance (CALI) plays an important role in the
car accident liability system in Taiwan.' All owners of cars or motorcycles have to purchase
CALI (before receiving car or motorcycle plates). In an automobile accident, even if no one
is at fault, the spouse, children, and parents of the dead can request the CALI fund to
indemnify them. The amount of CALI indemnification has increased over the years. As of
August 2014, the amount was 2 million Taiwan dollars, or U.S. $67,000, for a wrongful death
case. Pursuant to the CALI Act, the tortfeasor can request the court to deduct the CALI
indemnification from the court-adjudicated pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages." That
is, if the amount of the total court-adjudicated damages is less than 2 million Taiwan dollars,
the tortfeasor does not have to pay a penny from his or her own pocket, as the CALI fund
has footed the bill. If a court, say, awards 3 million Taiwan dollars, the out-of-pocket
payment of the defendant is 3 - 2 = 1 million Taiwan dollars.
Taiwan is considered a civil-law country. Almost all judges are careerjudges who may
or may not have practiced law before serving on the bench (many have not). Mostjurists in
Taiwan major in law as an undergraduate, while a minority ofjurists are trained in aj.D.-like
graduate program.Jurists who pass the bar exam and finish six months of practical training
are qualified to practice law. Jurists who pursue a career as a judge or prosecutor have to
'-Thus, we are not able to put these factors in the regression models, not even putting them to chi-square tests, to
examine whether they influence judicial decisions.
"Pursuant to Article 77-13 of Civil Procedure Code of Taiwan, the court fee is assessed in the following way: "NTD
1,000 on the first NTD 100,000 of the price or claim's value, and an additional amount shall be taxed for each
NTD 10,000 thereafter in accordance with the following rates: NTD 100 on the portion between NTD 100,001 and
NTD 1,000,000 inclusive; NTD 90 on the portion between NTD 1,000,001 and NTD 10,000,000 inclusive; NTD 80 on
the portion between NTD 10,000,001 and NTD 100,000,000 inclusive; NTD 70 on the portion between NTD
100,000,001 and NTD 1,000,000,000 inclusive; and NTD 60 on the portion over NTD 1,000,000,000. A fraction of
NTD 10,000 shall be rounded up to NTD 10,000 for purposes of taxing court costs."
"For more information, see the official website of CALL: <http://www.cali.org.tw/>.
"Commercial private insurance payments, by contrast, need not be deducted from the damages. In only one case we
sampled did the plaintiff voluntarily deduct the private insurance payment from the damages. We thus do not take
into account private insurance payments (the amount of which is unknown anyway) in the models.
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take the "court officer" examination. Those who pass the examination receive training in
the court officer institutes for two years. At the end of their training, based on their grades,
preferences, and openings, they become judges or prosecutors. Judges are tenured, and
thus presumably less influenced by external political influences. For civil matters, there are
three levels of courts: district courts, appellate courts, and the supreme court. The former
two can determine both questions of fact and questions of law, while the supreme court only
deals with questions of law. Appealing to the appellate court is as of right, whereas large-
stake cases represented by attorneys can be appealed to the supreme court, subject to its
discretion (Eisenberg & Huang 2012; Chen et al. 2014). All cases in district courts are
randomly assigned to judges.
III. HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY
In Section III.A, we lay out our three main hypotheses regarding the major determinants of
pain and suffering damages. In Section III.B, we describe and summarize the pertinent
data. In Section III.C, we spell out the single-equation and structural-equation models at the
individual and case levels.
A. Research Questions
Our core research question is to identify the major determinants of court-adjudicated pain
and suffering damages in wrongful death cases. The hypotheses are as follows.
First, the individual-level pain and suffering award varies by familial relations. Which
familial group tends to receive the most pain and suffering damages? We explore this
question by examining first the average and distribution of such damages by each familial
group. As not all groups are included in all cases, we also compare the groups' relative
damages when more than one group sues the defendant together. Before we started the
research, we informally surveyed a great many legal professionals and laypersons in Taiwan
as to which familial group they think would receive the most, as there is no prior literature
on this question. There was no consensus. Some guessed the parents. Indeed, the Chinese
saying "the white-haired mourn the passing of the black-haired" was cited by virtually all
cases we read that had parent plaintiffs. Some rooted for the spouse. Many believed that the
children who lost a broad shoulder and a role model would receive the most.
Second, we hypothesized thatjudges keep the amount of pain and suffering damages
within a certain limit, so as not to push the defendant into financial hardship. One critical
difference between pain and suffering damages in personal injury cases and those in
wrongful death cases is that in the former there is only one claimant for one tortious action
(i.e., the injured party himself or herself), whereas there could be several claimants in the
latter (mean and median around four plaintiffs; Table 1). The mean or median pain and
suffering damages awarded are not small amounts (mean and median around $33,000;
Table 1). If the victim is survived by his or her parents, spouse, and four children, and the
judge simply multiplies the median pain and suffering damages by seven-along with
pecuniary damages to dependent children, spouse, and/or parents-the heavy liability
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Continuous Variables
Variable
Pain and suffering damages
To spouse
To victim's minor child
To victim's adult child
To victim's dependent parent
To victim's nondependent parent
Total pain and suffering damages in
case ( W)*
Pain and suffering requests
Total pain and suffering requests in
case*
D's payment to P ordered in the
judgment (X)*
D's payment to P before the verdict
Victim's age*
Positive damages-income ratio
Negative damages-income ratiot
P's annual incomet
D's annual incomet*
Number of P*
Victim's comparative negligence (V)
(%)*
% of litigation fee paid by P*
D's actual payment of pecuniary
damages= X+ Y- [W* (1-V)]t*
N Mean Median SD Min.
599
86
46
275
28
164
182
1,009,906
1,113,359
897,826
756,182
1,638,702
1,305,189
3,315,569
950,000
1,000,000
900,000
600,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
3,000,000
656,622.5
519,868
461,514
444,079
904,120
801,055
1,772,505
596 1,746,200 1,500,000 1,415,016
182 5,740,304 5,000,000 3,537,548
599 218,029 1,676,067 1,858,679
599 133,434
433
92
229
460
397
599
599
51.3
1.07
-1.08
253,197
276,189
4.4
30
0 603,629
56
1.07
-1.09
81,889
264,000
4
20
21.5
0.13
0.14
401,310
226,494
1.9
30
200,000
200,000
400,000
200,000
500,000
300,000
600,000
Max.
5,000,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
5,000,000
5,000,000
10,000,000
200,000 19,165,311
1,000,000 23,665,311
0 11,500,000
0 4,150,000
2.3
0.65
-1.49
0
0
1
0
562 70 75 30 0
599 1,573,484 1,176,067 1,614,370 -1,532,425
91
1.37
-0.63
3,291,106
1,390,223
10
80
100
9,200,896
tOne plaintiff, one observation. Thus, plaintiffs income refers to the plaintiffs personal annual income. When there
is only one defendant, defendant's income refers to the defendant's personal annual income. In joint torts with
multiple natural-person defendants, defendant's income refers to the total annual incomes of all natural-person
defendants.
,Pecuniary damages as defined here could be negative because the amount of compensation the plaintiff receives
from the compulsory automobile liability insurance fund is subtracted from X. See Section II and footnote 32 for
more detailed explanation.
*Case-level statistics. Variables without the asterisk are individual level.
NOTE: P= plaintiff; D = defendant. Amount in Taiwan dollars. I U.S. dollar = 30 Taiwan dollars.
SOURCE: Chang et al. PS Damages Data Set 2014.
could bankrupt a middle-class defendant. Pushing a defendant into financial hardship is
undesirable because he or she could then choose to run away, paying nothing. Also,
financial hardship, not to mention bankruptcy, may destroy another (defendant's) family.
Hans (2000:209-14), based on interviews with numerous jurors, reports that jurors gener-
ally pay attention to the empty pockets of defendants (business or individual), whereas only
a minority ofjurors take into account the deep pockets of corporate defendants. Here, we
are able to examine whetherjudges adjust their awards based on the identity of defendants
and the financial hardship imposed on them.
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Table 1 continued
Panel B: Categorical Variables
At least one defendant is corporate 26.7
Plaintiff hires lawyer(s) 61.8
Defendant hires lawyer(s) 41.7
Plaintiff is victim's 100.0
Spouse 14.4
Minor children 7.7
Adult children 45.9
Parents who are financially independent (nondependent parents) 4.7
Parents who are not financially sustainable (dependent parents) 27.4
Financial units of natural-person defendants 100.0
Ot 1.2
1 93.0
2 5.5
3 0.3
Year 100.0
2008 18.4
2009 21.5
2010 19.2
2011 20.9
2012 20.0
tln these zero-defendant observations, the tortfeasors died at the accident and only their vicariously liable employers
were sued. N= 599.
SOURCE: Chang et al. PS Damages Data Set 2014.
More specifically, we conjecture that the financial hardship concern affects judges'
decisions on both the case and the individual levels. Specifically, on the case level, the
amount of pecuniary damages personally paid by the defendant divided by the defendant's
annual income negatively correlates with the amount of pain and suffering damages; the
existence of corporate defendants and the number of natural-person defendants positively
correlates with the amount of pain and suffering damages. On the individual level, the
amount of pain and suffering damages each plaintiff receives decreases with the number of
plaintiffs and with the amount of pecuniary damages personally paid by the defendant. In
addition, the amount of individual-level pain and suffering damages increases with the
existence of corporate defendants, and the number of natural-person defendants.
Finally, judges and juries, in determining a number without guidance, were likely to
be subject to the anchoring effect (Guthrie et al. 2000, 2007; Wistrich et al. 2005; Rachlinski
et al. 2006, 2007, 2009; Campbell et al. 2014).17 That is, another number, even an arbitrary
or irrelevant one, might influence the amount of pain and suffering damages. In a tort
lawsuit that leads to awards of pain and suffering damages, several salient numbers may
'
7For introduction to the anchoring effect, see, e.g., Ariely (2008:25-48), Kahneman (2011:119-28), and Teichman
and Zamir (2014).
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exist. In experiments, the ad damnum (a plaintiffs claim) has been found to have strong
anchoring effects; that is, the higher the ad damnum (a plaintiffs claim), the higher the
verdict (Campbell et al. 2014). We thus focus on examining whether the anchoring effects
of the ad damnum can also be found in real bench trials. Specifically, we test whether a
plaintiffs claim influences how much he or she receives and whether the total request by
all the plaintiffs in a case influences the total judicial awards.
B. The Data
All civil cases decided by the district courts in Taiwan since 2000 are available for download
on the official website of the judicial administration (Judicial Yuan) of Taiwan.'" We used
key words (see below) to search for car accident cases in which the victim died. We limited
our search to the district court cases (partially) won by the plaintiffs and rendered between
January 1, 2008, and December 31, 2012. " The research period was chosen to be consistent
with another pain and suffering article that some of us collaborated on (Chang et al. 2015).
We decided to focus on decisions by the court of first instance. As emphasized by Guthrie
et al. (2007:4) and Eisenberg and Heise (2013), most cases are handled by these courts;
many of these decisions are final in that they are not appealed;o and such cases avoid the
selection issues that arise in studying appellate cases, such as the parties' decisions to appeal
and settlement of cases pending appeal.
Wrongful death can be caused by car accidents, medical malpractice, assault, and the
like. We focus on car accident cases here because there are many such cases2 1 and the
background facts are similar (a person negligently22 hits and kills a stranger).22
Two rounds of case searching were conducted. In the first round, to assure geo-
graphic representation of the whole country, we stratified the random sample by judicial
district to obtain 10 percent of car accident cases from each district court." After filtering
out cases in which the victims were only injured, we had 54 cases coded into 171 observa-
tions (one plaintiff, one observation). We decided to conduct a second-round coding
"See <http://jirsjudicial.gov.tw/FJUD/> (website in Chinese).
"Small claim and simple proceeding cases are excluded because the judgments in these cases usually do not contain
enough information about the cases.
2oln the case of Taiwan, between 1996 and 2006, 60 percent of the torts cases were not appealed (Huang 2009:196).
2 tBy contrast, there were only 17 medical malpractice wrongful death cases during the same period.
22Taiwan law does not distinguish negligence and gross negligence when determining the amount of pain and
suffering damages. Probably as a result, the cases we code do not tell uIs whetherjudges consider the tortfeasors as
grossly negligent.
"in assault cases, for example, the tortfeasors' motivations vary and may affectjudges' decisions.
2
'The search term is, of course, in Chinese and hard to translate. A literal translation would be: (road traffic OR traffic
accident OR car accident NOT state responsibility) AND (Article 195 OR Article 194) AND (defendant pays OR defendants jointly
pay)-
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because the number of first-round observations was small and the data lacked information
on certain critical variables, such as the victim's age and the annual income of the plaintiffs
and defendants. The data set compiled in the first round is used in an independent set of
regressions as robustness check to make sure that our findings are externally valid.
In the second round, we added more search terms to ensure that income and age
were more likely to be observable from the judgments;" 204 car accident cases were
discovered. Ater reading the cases and screening out irrelevant observations,2 6 we were left
with 183 cases (599 observations, as there are multiple plaintiffs in many cases).27 In the
analysis that follows, we use the data set compiled in the second round to gain internal
validity.
The individual-level pain and suffering damages awarded by courts in Taiwan exhibit
somewhat bell-shaped distributions (after a log transformation) in all five familial relations,
as Figure 1 shows.28 The case-level pain and suffering damages also exhibit bell-shape
distributions, centering on $100,000 (see Figure 2). The skewed distribution supporting the
log transformation is typical of unbounded award outcomes. Figure 3 and unreported
statistics demonstrate that 52 percent (99 percent) of the individual-level pain and suffering
damages are in multiples of 500,000 (50,000) Taiwan dollars. The most common amounts
were 500,000, 1,000,000, and 1,500,000 Taiwan dollars. This preference for round numbers
in noneconomic damages is consistent with Hans and Reyna's (2011:133-37) gist-based
model of juries. Table 1 provides selected summary statistics of the data set. Panel A
summarizes continuous variables and Panel B summarizes categorical variables. For corre-
lation coefficients of several important continuous variables, see Tables 2 and 3.
C. Regression Models
Our empirical strategy is, first, in Subsection III.C.1, to use single-equation models to
identify important objective factors that affect judges' pain and suffering awards on the
individual level, putting aside the potential effect from plaintiffs' ad damnum. In Subsec-
tion III.C.2, structural-equation models are utilized to account for plaintiffs' requests and
examine whether the anchoring effect exists. As there is more than one plaintiff in most
cases, and judges are likely to make award decisions by taking into consideration the total
amount of pain and suffering damages, in Subsection III.C.3 we describe single-equation
and structural-equation models that use judges' case-level pain and suffering damages as
the dependent variable and the summation of all plaintiffs' requests as one independent
15A literal translation of the search term would be: (road traffic OR traffic accident OR car accident NOT state responsibility)
AND (Article 195 OR Article 194) AND (defendant pays OR defendants jointly pay) AND electronic gateway to tax information
AND salary AND (income OR gain) AND (years old).
"In a few observations, the plaintiffs were not relatives legally eligible for pain and suffering compensations, so they
received zero dollars. A few other observations were not pain and suffering cases but were captured by our search
terms. We excluded these observations from our analysis.
"Note that several cases showed up in both the first-round data set and the second-round data set.
"Throughout this article, the conversion rate is U.S. dollars: Taiwan dollars= 1:30.
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Figure 1: Distribution of court-adjudicated pain and suffering damages,
by familial relations.
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NOTE: Nfor each group in parentheses. The amounts of pain and suffering damages are CPI-adjusted and in U.S. dollars before
transformed into log 10. Taiwan court cases decided from 2008 through 2012.
SOURCE: Chang et al. PS Damages Data Set 2014.
variable. As mentioned above, the data used and reported in this section are the second-
round data. First-round data are used in the simplified version of the regression models as
a robustness check, but the regression results are not fully reproduced. Only inconsistent
findings will be noted and discussed in footnotes.
1. One-Equation Models on the Individual Level
We use regression models that account for stratifying the sample by court district and the
nonindependence of observations in cases with more than one plaintiff." The dependent
variable is the natural log of thejudge's pain and suffering damages award. The independ-
ent variables control for the defendant's payment of pecuniary damages, characteristics of
both parties and victims, and familial relations between the victim and the plaintiff. Year
and court fixed effects are also included. The models take the following form:
PSidv = Po 1 PECcas + A2CHidv,cas + 3FAidv + PDt + P51i + E, (1)
o be more exact, in the reported Model 3 in Table 5, we used the svy command in Stata to account for the fact that
we stratified the sampling by court and the unit of sampling is a case, not an observation. In the reported Models 1
and 2 in Table 5, we cannot use the svy command because of stratum with a single sampling unit; instead, we cluster
by case and report robust standard errors.
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Figure 2: Distribution of court-adjudicated case-level pain and suffering damages in wrong-
ful death cases in Taiwan.
tc)
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log 10 of sum of pain and suffering damages in a case (CPI adjusted)
NOTE: Amounts are in U.S. dollars and the figure includes 182 cases from 2008 through 2012.
SOURCE: Chang et al. PS Damages Data Set 2014.
where PSid, is the log of pain and suffering damages (CPI-index adjusted) on the individual
level; PECcase are the variables representing defendants' payment of pecuniary damages
(CPI-index adjusted) in natural log form, divided by defendants' annual income in natural
log form;`o CHeas. are several variables capturing the characteristics of the plaintiff, the
defendant, and the victim; FA are four dummy variables indicating five types of familial
relations; and Dt and Di are dummy variables indicating the years and courts of the case,
respectively. The coefficients to be estimated are In; E is an error term.
More specifically, PECcase includes three variables that are intuitive but need some
calculation work. The simplest one is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the defendant's
personal payment of pecuniary damages is positive; 0 otherwise. The other two variables are
defendants' personal payment of pecuniary damages (in log) divided by defendants'
annual income (in log) (hereinafter, "damages-income ratio"). These two damages-income
ratios measure the relative financial burden" caused by pecuniary compensation (hardly
"To assess endogeneity concerns related to using pecuniary payments as an independent variable where pain and
suffering is the dependent variable, we developed reasonable instruments for the positive and negative pecuniary
amount payments. These instrument variable models were then fit and Wu-Haussmann tests could not reject
exogeneity (positive award, p= 0.19 and negative award, p= 0.81).
5tAssets might be a better measure of financial burden, but most cases do not contain asset information (because the
ultimate source of data, the tax authority, does not require taxpayers to reveal their assets). lfjudges are not aware
of total assets, they cannot (explicitly) use them to adjust pain and suffering damages.
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Figure 3: Court-adjudicated individual-level pain and suffering damages for loss
of consortium.
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix
Structural-Equation Models
for Continuous Variables to be
PS PS
Damagest Requestst
Used in
Comparative
Age # ofP Negligence
Pain and suffering requestst 0.711***
N 596
Victim's age -0.578*** -0.507***
N 433 430
Number of P - -0. 600*** -0. 5 18*** 0.725***
N 599 596 433
Victim's comparative negligence (%) 0.051 -0.044 0.027 0.058
N 599 596 433 599
P's annual incomet 0.130** 0.052 -0.044 -0.094 0.004
N 460 459 340 460 460
NOTE: Pearson correlation coefficient reported in the table. ***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05; 'p< 0.1 (two-tailed).
tVariable in natural log. P represent plaintiffs; PS is pain and suffering; and # is number.
SOURCE: Chang et al. PS Damages Data Set 2014.
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Table 3: Partial Correlation Matrix for Damage-Income Ratios and Other Continuous
Variables to be Used in Structural-Equation Models
PS PS Comparative P
Damagest Requestst Age # of P Negligence Incomet
Positive damages-income -0.119* 0.049 -0.18** 0.082 0.065 -0.05
ratiot
N 329 326 241 329 329 288
Negative damages-income -0.209** -0.243*** 0.294*** 0.223*** 0.161** 0.188**
ratiot
N 329 326 241 329 329 288
NOTE: Partial correlation coefficient (controlling for the effect of the dummy variable that equals I if damages-
income ratios are >= 0 and equals 0 if they <0) reported in the table. ***p <0.001; **p <0.01; *p <0.05; p <0.1
(two-tailed). tVariable in natural log. P represent plaintiffs; PS is pain and suffering; and # is number.
SOURCE: Chang et al. PS Damages Data Set 2014.
adjustable by courts) on defendants. Two continuous variables are needed because defend-
ants' out-of-pocket payment of pecuniary damages can be positive or negative, and their
magnitude might be very different. One variable captures the positive amount, whereas the
other variable captures the absolute value of the negative amount.
Defendant's personal (or out-of-pocket) payment of pecuniary damages is calculated
in the following way: the amount of damages the defendant(s) still owes all the plaintiffs (as
stipulated in the holding) + the amount of damages the defendant(s) has paid the plaintiffs
prior to the verdict - the amount of adjudicated pain and suffering damages * (1 - plain-
tiffs' ratio of comparative negligence)." More intuitively, the defendant's personal payment
of pecuniary damages is pecuniary damages minus CALI payment. Thus, the defendant's
payment of pecuniary damages could be negative (and, indeed, is negative in 424 obser-
vations) when CALI indemnification is larger than the pecuniary damages.
The idea behind this variable is thatjudges are likely to determine the amount of the
more objective, relatively standardized pecuniary damages first," and then embark on
considering the more discretionary pain and suffering damages. And when doing the latter
task, judges would take into account the probability of the defendant's financial hardship
such as bankruptcy. The higher the positive damages-income ratio, the more likely the
defendant would have financial troubles. Thus, we hypothesize that the damages-income
ratio, when positive, will negatively correlate with the pain and suffering damages and when
negative will also be negatively correlated with the pain and suffering damages. (Note that
the variable used in the models takes the absolute value of the payment, so the variable that
captures the negative damages-income ratio is expected to have a positive coefficient.)
"Put differently, using the notation in Table 1, X= (pecuniary damages + W) * (1 - V) - Y- CALl. After rearrange-
ment, we obtain another equation: X+ Y- W* (1 - V) = pecuniary damages * (1 - V) - CALl.
3
Pecuniary damages include the reimbursement of the funeral expenses and living expenses for many years (until
adulthood, for minor children; until expected life, for spouses and dependent parents). See Section II for more
details.
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The hypothesis behind the negative relationship is as follows: if the defendant's
personal payment of pecuniary damages is negative (say, minus 1 million dollars), the first
1 million dollars in the court-adjudicated pain and suffering damages are considered
already paid for by the CALI fund. The defendant does not have to actually pay these from
his or her own pocket. This should tend to increase the amount of pain and suffering
damages, as there is less hardship concern. Also, courts might be concerned that if the
negligent tortfeasor walks away without paying anything, it will weaken the deterrent effect
of tort law. Hence, the smaller the negative personal payment by the defendant (i.e., the
larger the absolute value of the payment), the more room courts have in awarding pain and
suffering damages to the plaintiffs without requesting defendants to pay for them person-
ally, the larger the pain and suffering damages tend to be-thus the negative relationship
between pain and suffering damages and the negative personal payment by the defendant.
By contrast, the hypothesis behind the negative relationship when the personal
payment is positive is that a positive amount suggests that every penny of the court-
adjudicated pain and suffering damages has to be paid by the defendant personally. This
should tend to decrease the amount of pain and suffering damages, due to the hardship
concern. Because of the potential opposite effect of the defendant's payment of pecuniary
damages, we use two continuous variables to capture the effect.
CHi1y is the natural log of each plaintiffs income (CPI-index adjusted). CHe
includes a variable on victim's age;" the natural log of the number of plaintiffs; the natural
log of all defendants' income (CPI-index adjusted);" dummy variables for whether the
plaintiff and the defendant are represented by attorneys; a continuous variable represent-
ing the proportion of the victim's comparative negligence (in our data set, from 0-80
percent) ; a dummy variable on whether the defendants include one or more corporations;
and a variable that measures the number of "financial units" among noncorporate
defendants.
The last two variables warrant more explanation. In our database, the corporate
defendants were employers of the defendant(s) and vicariously liable for the tort. We
conjecture that courts would increase the amount of pain and suffering damages when
there is a corporate defendant because corporations are considered deep-pocketed. The
financial unit variable is used to more accurately measure whether courts worry about
putting too much financial burden on defendants. All else equal, the more defendants
there are to share the burden of paying damages, the less likely that one or all of them will
be financially challenged. Nevertheless, the number of defendants as listed in the judg-
ments is not the most exact measure of the defendant's financial wherewithal. For example,
in all 23 three-defendant observations in our data set, the defendants were a minor
tortfeasor and his or her parents (who are vicariously liable). They can be counted as only
one financial unit, as adding a nonearning minor and a house spouse as defendants does
"We tried adding the square of age as another independent variable, but it is insignificant.
31In all observations with available information, courts acquire income information from the Ministry of Finance.
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not make the sole breadearner less likely to be financially challenged." Hence, we carefully
examine the relationships among the defendants (revealed in court decisions) and count
the number of financial units (Table 1).
Dt is a series of dummy variables (one for each year) that controls the timing of the
judgment. Di are a series of court dummy variables that control for the variance among
jurisdictions. We combined 20 courts into 12, as a few courts had only a handful of
observations, and used 11 dummies to control for intercourt variation. The combinations
are based on geographic proximity and similarity in economic development.
We report three models. Model 1 is the baseline model, with damages-income ratios
as the major independent variables of interest. Model 2 is a robustness check, using
payment of pecuniary damages (without dividing by defendants' income) as the independ-
ent variable of interest and using defendants' income as a separate variable. In Models 1
and 2, only observations with positive plaintiff income and positive defendant income are
included. The latter condition is necessary for Model 1, since defendant income is the
denominator. We were hesitant to assign infinity or an arbitrary number to the damages-
income ratio in observations where defendant income was zero. Observations in which
plaintiffs had zero income were excluded because we found, in exploratory analysis, that
the models for pain and suffering awards and requests for the plaintiffs with zero and
positive incomes are substantively different. Model 3 is a variant on Model 2, but discards
age, plaintiff income, and defendant income, all of which had many missing values, in order
to use all observations in the regression models. This is also a robustness check on whether
variable coefficients and signs change significantly if observations with missing values are
added.
2. Structural-Equation Models on the Individual Level
Our data include the amount plaintiffs requested in pain and suffering damages. Such
information had not been available in prior pain and suffering studies, except in another
article by some of us (Chang et al. 2015) and in Diamond et al. (2011), which observes 19
such cases. We did not include it in the above single-equation regression models due to
endogeneity. The requested amount is not independent of other explanatory variables such
as plaintiffs' income, but the requested amount is of obvious interest and potential impor-
tance. It might be expected to influence the awarded amount in two ways. First, higher
requested amounts put higher numbers before the judge. Anchoring theory suggests that
higher requested numbers will be associated with higher awarded numbers independently
of the merits of an increased award. Second, higher requested amounts may be associated
with factors that should have increased awards but were not represented by observable
variables. The plaintiff (or his or her attorney), in formulating the requested amount, may
have had access to information about the degree or nature of pain and suffering that we
cannot observe-for critical reflection of this line of argument, see Section IV.C. To
account for the more complex relationship among the variables in models that include the
"Even when all three earn money, we still think that they are better treated as one financial unit.
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Table 4: Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' Pain and
Suffering Damages
Defendant's Response Freq. Percent
Plaintiffs claim too high 297 49.6
Do not counter PS claims 95 15.9
Counter with specific claims 36 6.0
Give no counter claims at all 27 4.5
Zero PS damages 19 3.2
Too poor to pay PS damages 107 17.9
Defer to court 16 2.7
PS damages within certain cap 2 0.3
Total 599 100.0
NOTE: PS= pain and suffering.
SOURCE: Chang et al. PS Damages Data Set 2014.
plaintiffs' request, particularly the endogeneity problem, we employ a structural-equation
model. Note that we could not meaningfully model the defendant's recommendation
concerning pain and suffering damages due to its variety and lack of explicit amounts (see
Table 4).
The structural-equation model (based on Model 1 in Table 5) takes the following
form:
PSidv = ao + alC[AIMid+ a2 PECmas + aSCHidvcm + a 4FAidv + E, (2)
CLAIMidv 03A + IPECcae + /2CHidvcase + fFAidv + # 4 PLase + E. (3)
The model uses almost identical variables as those used in the single-equation model
(Equation (1)), except the following. (1) CLAIMidy, which represents each plaintiffs
request for pain and suffering damages is added to both equations. The plaintiff request
equation (Equation (3)) is added to control for the endogeneity problem. Note that the
coefficients in the court award equation (Equation (2)) show the direct effects of the
independent variables on court awards, excluding the indirect effects of them on court
awards through plaintiffs' claims. (2) The plaintiff request equation does not include the
defendant's annual income, of which the plaintiff most likely was uninformed when making
her request. (3) The plaintiff also could not have known the amount of pecuniary damages
to be awarded by judges. Thus, the three variables on damages-income ratio are not
included. Nevertheless, the plaintiff knew the amount of CALI payment, as well as the
amount of payment from the defendant, before the verdict (in fact, it is generally paid
before the lawsuit starts, usually used by the defendant to signal a sincere apology). These
two new variables (constituting fl4PLeas) are thus included in the plaintiffs request
equation (Equation (3)). (4) As plaintiffs did not know whether defendants would hire
lawyers when making their petitions, the dummy variable on whether defendants hired
lawyers is not included in the request equation. (5) Year and court fixed effects are omitted
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Table 5: Regression Models of Court-Awarded Pain and Suffering
Individual Plaintiffs
Damages for
Dependent Variable: CPI-Adjusted Pain and Suffering Damages Awarded to Individual Plaintiffs
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Damages-Income Ratio
Positive amount
Negative amount
Payment of Pecuniary Damages#
Positive amount
Negative amount
= I if positive amount
Victim's age
P annual income (if> 0)#
D annual income (if> 0)#
-0.719***
(0.202)
0.367
(0.417)
0.886+
(0.521)
-0.012**
(0.004)
0.002
(0.013)
-0.060***
(0.017)
0.016
(0.033)
0.760
(0.497)
-0.011**
(0.004)
0.000
(0.013)
-0.046
(0.070)
-0.026
(0.018)
0.076+
(0.041)
1.283*
(0.592)
Familial Relations (Baseline: Spouse)
Victim's minor child Omitted Omitted -0.264***
(0.073)
Victim's adult child -0.362*** -0.356*** -0.294***
(0.082) (0.083) (0.045)
Victim's nondependent parent -0.441* -0.421* -0.113
(0.168) (0.164) (0.105)
Victim's dependent parent -0.411** -0.420** -0.160*
(0.146) (0.148) (0.069)
Number of P -0.100* -0.099* -0.151***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.020)
P's comparative negligence (%) 0.229 0.255 0.257*
(0.197) (0.200) (0.126)
P hires lawyer(s) -0.030 -0.018 0.044
(0.105) (0.108) (0.065)
D hires lawyer(s) 0.122 0.141 0.103
(0.091) (0.102) (0.066)
= 1 if>= 1 corporate D 0.318*** 0.330*** 0.223**
(0.089) (0.092) (0.073)
Number of D financial units 0.504 0.498 0.027
(0.332) (0.328) (0.127)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Court fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant 13.714*** 14.413*** 13.321***
(0.530) (1.245) (0.641)
Observations(cases) 124 124 599
I 2  0.859 0.861 0.540
NOTE: #Means natural log transformation after CPI-index adjusted. P means plaintiff, and D means defendant.
Coefficients in cells. Models I and 2: clustered by case and robust standard errors in parentheses. Model 3 uses Stata
svy command to account for the fact that the sampling unit is a case and includes standard errors in parentheses.
***p<0.001; **p< 0.01; * p<0.05; +p<0.1.
SOURCE: Chang et al. PS Damages Data Set 2014.
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in both equations. (6) The dummy variable on whether the plaintiff hires lawyers is not
included in the award equation in one of the two models.37
We report two structural-equation models. In both models, only observations in
which the incomes of the defendants are larger than zero are included, as defendants'
incomes are the denominator in the damages-income ratio. In the first model (Columns 1
and 2 in Table 7), observations in which the incomes of the plaintiffs are larger than zero
are included, for the same reason specified in the previous subsection. In the second model
(Columns 3 and 4 in Table 7), we keep the 189 observations with zero-income plaintiffs,
and add an additional dummy variable (which equals I if the plaintiffs annual income is
zero; 0 otherwise).3 1
3. Regression Models on the Case Level
Most cases in our data set had multiple plaintiffs eligible for pain and suffering awards. The
single-equation and structural-equation models described above address individual-level
judicial decisions. To ascertain whether the judges were subject to the anchoring effect and
whether the judges were concerned about putting too much financial burden on defend-
ants, it is also necessary to examine case-level decisions.
A majority of independent variables in the aforementioned regression models are
already case-invariant information, such as whether attorneys are hired. In the two sets of
regression models that examine case-level decisions, sum of pain and suffering damages
awarded to all plaintiffs in the case and sum of all plaintiffs' requests for pain and suffering
damages are the dependent variable and the major independent variable of interest,
respectively. Familial relations are individual-level variables. We did not use a series of
dummy variables that represent different combinations of familial members in case-level
regressions to preserve degree of freedom.
Due to the limited number of case-level observations, we use parsimonious models in
both the single-equation and structural-equation models. The single-equation model,
taking the following form, keeps the three variables regarding payment of pecuniary
damages, three variables regarding the number and income" of plaintiffs, two variables on
defendants' financial condition, whether lawyers were hired, the percentage of the victim's
negligence, and year fixed effects:
PScase = fo+tPECcas +/ 2CHase + 3t+ E. (4)
"Stata is unable to produce results with this variable in the model ("initial values not feasible"). This variable (whether
plaintiffs hire attorneys) is statistically insignificant in the other model and all other models in this article. Thus, we
should be confident that lawyer representation is not an important determinant of pain and suffering damages in
Taiwan.
"Note that if we have no information regarding either party's income, the income variable is coded as missing. Thus,
the 189 observations mentioned in the text are indeed those with a plaintiff without income.
"I1f a case contains multiple plaintiffs and the incomes of some of them are missing, we treat those as zero in summing
the total annual income on the plaintiffs side.
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Figure 4: Distribution of court-adjudicated individual-level pain and suffering damages in
wrongful death cases in Taiwan, by familial relations.
spouse(86) *-** *
victim's minor child (46)
victim's adult child (275)
victim's dependent parent (28) *
victim's nondependent parent (164) *
3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5
log 10 of pain and suffering damages
NOTE: Numbers of observations in each group in parentheses. The amounts of pain and suffering damages are CPI-adjusted and
in U.S. dollars before transformed into loglo. Recall logio (10,000)= 4 , loglo (31,622)= 4 .5, and logio(100,000)= 5. Taiwan
court cases decided from 2008 through 2012.
SOURCE: Chang et al. PS Damages Data Set 2014.
The structural-equation model takes the following form:
PSse = ao + a 1CLAIMes + a2PECcas + a3CHease + E, (5)
CLAIMcase = fP + PIPECase + P2CHes + P3PLcase + E. (6)
The court award equation (Equation (5)) in the structural-equation model is basically the
same as the single-equation model (Equation (4)), except that the year fixed effects are not
used, and the percentage of victim's negligence is removed but still placed in the request
equation, as we find in the structural-equation models on the individual level that this
percentage is only significant in the request equation. The request equation is also a
simplified version of that in the structural-equation model on the individual level. All
individual-level variables are removed (e.g., familial relations) or replaced with their
case-level aggregates (e.g., plaintiffs' claims and court awards).
IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
A. Differences Among Relatives
As compared to other familial relations, spouses receive the highest pain and suffering
damages. Cursory readings of Figure 4, Figure 1, and Panel A of Table I leave the impres-
sion that parents, especially dependent parents, receive more pain and suffering damages
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Table 6: Differences in Pain and Suffering Damages Among Familial Relations in the
Same Case
Row Versus Column (>, =, <) Minor Child Adult Child Dependent Parent Nondependent Parent
Spouse (5, 10, 0) (44, 21, 0) (15, 14, 0) (15, 14, 3)
Minor child (1, 4, 0) (3, 0, 0) (5, 12, 1)
Adult child (1, 1, 0) (1, 13, 9)
Dependent parent (0, 1, 0)
NOTE: I represents one case (not one observation). For example, (5, 10, 0) in the tipper-left cell in the table means
that in five cases, spouse received more than minor child; in 10 cases, the pain and suffering damages were the same;
and in zero cases, the spouse received less than the minor child.
SOURCE: Chang et al. PS Damages Data Set 2014.
than spouses, as the mean and median amounts of the pain and suffering damages in these
two groups greatly differ. Nevertheless, this does not suggest that when spouses and parents
both claim in the same case, judges award more damages to the latter group. Careful
observation of the data reveals that parents (with victims often around 20 years old) receive
large pain and suffering damages when they are the only familial group that makes the
request. Leaving aside cases in which only one familial group is listed as plaintiffs, and
comparing the pain and suffering damages received by different familial groups case by
case, we find that, in terms of the pain and suffering damages received in a given case, the
following inequality generally holds: spouse minor child parents adult child. That is,
for example, courts in Taiwan rarely give spouses less pain and suffering damages than
other relatives of the victim, and minor children of the victim almost always receive pain
and suffering compensation more than or equal to adult children or parents. For more
detailed comparisons, see Table 6.
Regression results, as reported in Table 5,40 bear out the finding that spouses receive
the most pain and suffering damages. In all single-equation individual-level models
reported in Table 5, all familial relation dummies have negative signs and all but one are
statistically significant. As spouse is the baseline category, the regression clearly shows that,
as compared to other familial groups, spouses receive more pain and suffering damages. We
further test whether the differences between the coefficients of the four dummy variables
are statistically significant, but none of them are.
B. Hardship Concern
We find evidence for the claim that courts are concerned about putting too much financial
burden on the defendants. We mainly rely on results from structural-equation models on
"We run Model 3 on first-round data for a robustness check. Coefficients of all but one major variables have the same
sign, though some of them become statistically insignificant, perhaps for lack of degrees of freedom (N= 168). The
defendant's financial unit has a negative sign and is highly statistically significant (p<0.001). This result is
counterimtuitive. In first-round data, this variable equals I in 167 of the 171 observations, and equals 2 in the other
four observations. The lack of variance casts doubt on the reliability of the estimate of this variable.
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the individual level and on the case level" (reported in Tables 7" and 9), but we also
reference the results from single-equation models on the individual level and on the case
level" (reported in Tables 5 and 8) as a robustness check. All models show that when the
damages-income ratio is positive, the variables capturing it have negative coefficients, and
all but one have a statistically significant (at least at the 0.01 level) impact on the pain and
suffering damages awarded to individual plaintiffs as well as the total pain and suffering
damages given to all plaintiffs. When the damages-income ratios are negative, this variable
in all models has positive coefficients, as expected, and this variable is statistically significant
(at least at the 0.01 level) in both the structural-equation models on the individual level."
We ran the model using the absolute value of the amount; therefore, a positive coefficient
means that the higher the deduction of CALI payment from the pain and suffering
damages, the higher the awarded amounts of court-adjudicated pain and suffering
damages."
Figure 5, showing the negative relations between damages-income ratio and the
amount of pain and suffering damages, corroborates the regression results. The left plot in
Figure 5, however, shows that if all defendants are natural persons, the result4 -lower
damages-income ratios leading to lower pain and suffering damages-is the opposite of
what we expected. To further test the phenomenon, we added an interaction term (a
continuous variable on negative damages-income ratio * a dummy variable on whether
defendants include corporations) to unreported single-equation and structural-equation
models at both the individual and case levels, with all observations or with observations with
negative out-of-pocket payment. The interaction term is never close to statistical signifi-
cance. Also, the absolute value of the coefficient for the interaction term is small compared
4 11t was not feasible to run a properly specified, structural-equation model on either level with first-round data.
42The sample size used in structural-equation models reported in Table 7 is not very large, so we ran 500 bootstrap
versions of these models to assess the impact of the smaller sample size. The results are consistent with the
structural-equation models; thus, the small sample size should not be problematic.
45We could not run the same single-equation, case-level models on first-round data, as there were so many missing
values for plaintiff income and defendant income. Another model, using defendants' payment of pecuniary damages
(without being divided by defendants' income) as the major independent variable, and not using any income variable,
demonstrates similar results, though the independent variables of interest are not statistically significant at the 0.05
level. N= 54.
"The single-equation model on the individual level also reveals a positive and statistically significant effect of a
negative out-of-pocket payment. But note that the payment there is not divided by defendant's income.
"Baker (2001) finds that in the United States, attorneys for the plaintiffs are reluctant to go after "blood money"
(meaning defendants' personal assets), unless the tort actions lead to death or serious injury or involve rape. Our
context falls into the category where plaintiffs in the United States would still demand blood money. Nonetheless, in
light of Baker's theory, our finding can be interpreted asjudges in Taiwan being concerned over awarding too much
blood money to the plaintiffs.
"The partial correlation coefficient between the absolute value of the negative damages-income ratio and the pain
and suffering damages awards has a negative sign. This is consistent with the result shown in Figure 5 for the
natural-person defendants.
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Table 7: Structural-Equation Model Relating to the Requested Pain and Suffering Award
on the Individual-Award Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pain & Suffering Pain & Suffering Pain & Suffering Pain & Suffering
Variables Award Request Award Request
Plaintiffs pain and suffering 1.327*** 1.374*
request*# (0.374) (0.605)
Damages-Income Ratio
Positive amount* -0.361** -0.262+
(0.139) (0.137)
Negative amount* 1.176** 0.896*
(0.359) (0.366)
= I if positive amount* 1.398*** 0.925*
(0.397) (0.384)
Victim's age* -0.006 -0.007 0.001 -0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Familial Relations (Baseline: Spouse)
Victim's minor child (constrained) (constrained) 0.244 -0.290+
(0.280) (0.161)
Victim's adult child* 0.074 -0.357*** 0.080 -0.230*
(0.173) (0.108) (0.179) (0.105)
Victim's nondependent parent* -0.443+ -0.031 -0.261 -0.050
(0.255) (0.246) (0.282) (0.244)
Victim's dependent parent* -0.235 -0.222 0.021 -0.247
(0.227) (0.210) (0.252) (0.176)
Number of P* 0.060 -0.154*** 0.052 -0.154***
(0.068) (0.044) (0.100) (0.046)
% of victim's negligence -0.079 0.451+ -0.356 0.417+
(0.269) (0.257) (0.307) (0.242)
P hires lawyer -0.062 0.031 -0.017
(0.099) (0.127) (0.125)
D hires lawyer 0.030 0.058
(0.070) (0.090)
= 1 if >= 1 corporate D* -0.244 0.490*** -0.293 0.449***
(0.217) (0.119) (0.285) (0.125)
Number of D financial units* -0.233 0.753+ -0.611 0.721*
(0.304) (0.401) (0.527) (0.318)
P annual income#* -0.030 0.048* -0.025 0.050*
(0.024) (0.022) (0.036) (0.021)
= I if P annual income = 0 -0.425 0.677**
(0.466) (0.259)
Amount P receives from -0.018 -0.008
compulsory automobile liability (0.013) (0.012)
insurance#
Amount P receives from D before 0.019* 0.024+
verdict#* (0.008) (0.012)
Constant -5.468 13.971*** -5.833 13.881***
(5.295) (0.593) (8.582) (0.506)
Observations 124 124 211 211
Coefficient of determination 0.802 0.709
NOTE: #Means natural log transformation after CPI-index adjusted. P means plaintiff, and D means defendant. * in
the variable column shows that the total effect of the variable in both models is statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. In Columns I and 2, only observations in which both plaintiffs and defendant's income >0 are included. In
Columns 3 and 4, only observations in which defendant's income >0 are included. The model is a structural-equation
model with the pain and suffering award and request modeled simultaneously. The model accounts for the court
strata and the nonindependence of multiple plaintiff cases. Robust standard errors in parentheses; clustered by case.
p (the correlation between the error terms in the two equations) in Columns 1 and 2 is -0.123 and that in Columns
3 and 4 is -0.168. The two p are statistically insignificant at the 0.05 level. ***p <0.001; **p <0.01; * p <0.05; +p < 0.1.
SOURCE: Chang et al. PS Damages Data Set 2014.
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Table 8: Regression Models of Court-Awarded Total
Pain and Suffering Damages in Cases
Dependent Variable: Court-Awarded Total Pain and Suifering Damages
in Cases
Variables (1)
Damages-Income Ratio
Positive amount -1.046***
(0.179)
Negative amount -0.640
(0.421)
I if positive amount 0.210
(0.473)
Victim's age -0.008*
(0.003)
All P annual income combined# 0.076**
(0.028)
Number of P 0.152***
(0.043)
% of victim's negligence 0.114
(0.194)
P hires lawyer(s) 0.018
(0.132)
D hires lawyer(s) 0.217+
(0.111)
>= I corporate D 0.245*
(0.116)
Number of noncorporate D financial units 0.302
(0.432)
Year fixed effects Yes
Constant 13.489***
(0.682)
Observations 62
0.615
NOTE: #Means natural log transformation after CPI-index adjusted. P
means plaintiff, and D means defendant. Coefficients in cells and robust
standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05;
+p < 0.1.
SOURCE: Chang et al. PS Damages Data Set 2014.
to that for the continuous variable on negative damages-income ratio. Hence, the opposite
effect of negative damages-income ratios on pain and suffering damages in observations
with only natural-person defendants disappears after we controlled for other factors
included in the regression models. Our general story still holds.
Notably, the structural-equation models on the individual level indirectly support the
financial hardship hypothesis. In the plaintiffs request equations (Columns 2 and 4 in
Table 7), the dummy variable on corporate defendant is statistically significant at the 0.001
level, and the continuous variable on the number of financial units on the defendant's side
is statistically significant at the 0.05 and 0.1 levels. These two variables have positive signs. In
Pain and Suffering Damages in Wrongful Death Cases
Figure 5: Defendant's relative compensation burden versus individual-level pain and suf-
fering damages.
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other words, plaintiffs demand higher pain and suffering damages when defendants are
likely to have deeper pockets. Moreover, the' variable on the number of plaintiffs in
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 7 has a negative coefficient (see also Figure 6) and is statistically
significant at the 0.001 level, again consistent with our theory, as the plaintiffs may expect
that courts will not just multiply a fixed amount of pain and suffering damages by the
number of plaintiffs,4 7 and the plaintiff does not have an incentive to bankrupt the defend-
ant for fear of receiving nothing from the latter. Interestingly, none of the aforementioned
variables is statistically significant in the judicial award equations. In addition, the variable
on plaintiffs request in the judicial award equations is always positive and statistically
significant at least at the 0.05 level, both on the individual level and case level (Models 1 and
"The variable on the number of plaintiffs in Columns 2 and 4 in Table 9 has a positive coefficient, but this is not
surprising. On the case level, the total amount of demanded pain and suffering damages tends to increase with the
number of plaintiffs in the case.
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Figure 6: Number of plaintiffs versus plaintiffs' requested (individual-level) pain and suf-
fering damages.
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3 in Table 7 and Model 1 in Table 9).These findings suggest that the judicial award was
based on the plaintiffs evaluation. Put differently, our interpretation is that whether
defendants were corporate and the numbers of the two parties influenced court-
adjudicated pain and suffering awards through plaintiffs' requests, and judges do not give
different weights to these factors."
C. Anchoring Effect
At least two reasons suggest that the plaintiffs pain and suffering damages request should be
relevant to the judge's pain and suffering award. First, judges will not award more than
plaintiffs request. The request therefore caps the pain and suffering award and should be
nonrandomly associated with it. Second, plaintiffs have an incentive to make reasonable
4 We conjecture, counterfactually, that had plaintiffs failed to pay attention to the probability of putting too much
financial burden on defendants (i.e., whether defendants are corporate and the number of the two parties are not
statistically significant in the request equations), the relevant variables in the award equations may turn statistically
significant.
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Table 9: Structural-Equation Model Relating to the Requested Pain and Suffering Award
on the Case Level
(1) (2)
Total Pain & Sufering Total Pain & Suffering
Vaiables Awards to All P Requests by All P
Plaintiff's total pain and suffering 0.896**
request# (0.309)
Damages-Income Ratio
Positive amount -0.453**
(0.159)
Negative amount 0.596+
(0.322)
= 1 if positive amount 0.885*
(0.351)
Victim's age -0.002 -0.009**
(0.003) (0.003)
# of P receiving pain and suffering 0.017 0.159**
damages for dead victim in the case (0.061) (0.050)
% of victim's negligence -0.138 0.408***
(0.181) (0.121)
I if >= 1 corporate D 0.042 0.670
(0.198) (0.450)
Number of D financial units 0.002 0.052
(0.028) (0.043)
All P annual income combined# 0.356
(0.245)
The amount P receives from -0.024+
compulsory automobile liability (0.014)
insurance#
The amount P receives from D before 0.021+
verdict# (0.012)
Constant 0.592 13.945***
(4.423) (0.666)
Observations 62 62
Coefficient of determination 0.501
NOTE: #Means natural log transformation after CPI-index adjusted. P means plaintiff, and D means defendant. The
model is a structural-equation model with the pain and suffering award and request modeled simultaneously. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. p (the correlation between the error terms in the two equations) is -0.061 and
statistically insignificant. ***p <0.001; **p <0.01; *p<0.05; +p<0.1.
SOURCE: Chang et al. PS Damages Data Set 2014.
pain and suffering requests because the court fee increases as the requested amount
increases. The two reasons themselves, however, do not necessarily imply that plaintiffs'
requests will be highly positively correlated with judges' awards, all else equal. Experiments
have shown that the plaintiffs' ad damnum influences judges' awards (e.g., Chapman &
Bornstein 1996; Diamond et al. 1998:318-19; Hastie et al. 1999; Campbell et al. 2014).11 As
"But compare Diamond etal. (2011:172-74), who find that real jurors appeared more inclined to reject ad
damnums.
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experiments can control for all other factors in the hypothetical case, the influence is
attributed to the effect of the request itself; hence the results can be interpreted as evidence
for the existence of the anchoring effect.
To examine whether the anchoring effect exists in real-world tort litigation, we
adopted a structural-equation approach in which the structural equation includes the
plaintiffs requested pain and suffering amount and an additional equation models the
plaintiff's requested amount as a function of objectively observable factors. Our model is
recursive and therefore is identified."o The variables on plaintiffs' requests are statistically
significant at least at the 0.05 level and have positive coefficients. That is, holding other
factors constant, the more plaintiffs request, the more judges award. This result is consistent
with the experimental findings regarding the anchoring effect of plaintiff requests. None-
theless, like other observational studies, our models are not able to control for everything.
The statistical significance of the plaintiffs request is thus subject to interpretations other
than the anchoring effect.
Given the anchoring interpretation, judges can be interpreted as following the
"anchor and adjust" procedure, although not in its classical sense (Tversky & Kahneman
1974:1128). The statistical significance of the variable capturing a plaintiffs request in the
court award equation is evidence for the anchoring part. As for the adjustment part,judges
do not adjust the required amount to approach a reasonable amount (as no such thing
exists); rather, they adjust to avoid putting too much financial burden on defendants.
D. Plaintiffs' Claim Pattern
Our research sets out to examine the determinants of pain and suffering damages adjudi-
cated by courts. In doing so, we found that what drove the amount of plaintiffs' requests is
also an interesting topic. We report the findings here.
First, plaintiffs take into account the financial conditions of the defendants in making
their claims, as the number of plaintiffs, existence of corporate defendants, and the
number of financial units on the defendant side are statistically significant in the plaintiff
request equation (see Table 7). These variables are not statistically significant in the court
award equation. In other words, the direct effects of these three variables are weak, whereas
their indirect effects on court awards through their influence on plaintiffs' request are
stronger. Indeed, their total effects (the sum of the direct effect and the indirect effect) are
all statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level.
Second, victim's age has a negative effect on the amount requested by plaintiffs, and
is statistically significant in most models. The surviving relatives appear to feel less sorrow
when the victim has spent a long time on the earth. Third, the incomes of individual
plaintiffs or all plaintiffs have positive effects (see Figure 7). These variables in the plaintiff
request equation in the structural-equation models on the individual level are statistically
significant at the 0.05 level, suggesting that plaintiffs with positive income demand a higher
5
oA sufficient condition for a recursive model to be identified is that the covariance between the error terms is
specified to be equal to zero (Bollen 1989:95-98). Upon fitting the recursive structural-equation models we could not
reject that the covariance between the error terms is equal to zero.
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Figure 7: Plaintiffs income versus plaintiffs requested (individual-level) pain and suffer-
ing damages.
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amount of pain and suffering damages when they have more earning capacity. Fourth,
whether plaintiffs hired attorneys has no effect on the requested (and awarded) amount.5t
Finally, the effect of a defendant's apology on plaintiff claims is worth exploring. Our
intuition was that if the defendant offered his or her apology to the surviving relatives
before the litigation, it would reduce the chance of plaintiffs resorting to the court, and
when the plaintiffs did, it would reduce the requested amount of compensation. We have
no information on whether the defendants were apologetic, and we do not know how many
accidents settled out of court. We do know the amount of defendants' prelitigation
payment to the plaintiff. This voluntary payment could be considered a form of apology.
Nevertheless, regression results reported in Table 7 show that the amount of such payment
has a positive and (marginally) statistically significant effect on the amount of pain and
suffering damage requested by the plaintiff. Robbennolt (2008:379-80) finds that plaintiffs'
attorneys tend to increase the claimed amount of compensation when defendants offer
their apology, whereas other experiments have found that apologies tend to decrease
"in unreported models, we also test whether attorneys would create statistically significant effects if only one party
hires them. The result is still statistically insignificant. We have also done a ttest to examine whether plaintiffs' income
may have affected their decisions to hire attorneys: p = 0.68 in the two-sided test.
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layperson plaintiffs' estimate of fair settlement value. The plaintiffs in our data behaved like
the former, upping the ante when receiving a form of apology before litigation. To tease
out whether prepayment as an apology affects plaintiffs with attorneys and those without
differently, we add an interaction term (dummy on plaintiffs hiring attorneys x the amount
of prepayment) to the two structural-equation models reported in Table 7. Unreported
tables show that the prepayment variable and the interaction term both are statistically
insignificant (both have positive signs). The lack of statistical significance may be due to
lack of degrees of freedom and collinearity. This issue is worth exploring further in future
studies.
V. CONCLUSION
We show that in determining pain and suffering damages in car accident cases, an impor-
tant concern for both plaintiffs and courts was not putting overwhelming financial
burdens on defendants. Plaintiffs' requests have strong influence on court awards, sug-
gesting that the anchoring effect is at work. On the individual level, when different famil-
ial groups appear as plaintiffs in one case, courts tend to award spouses the most pain and
suffering damages. Spouses are followed by minor children, parents, and adult children.
The as-expected judicial behaviors, consistent results, respectable coefficient of determi-
nation (all > 0.5), and other test statistics reveal the predictability of pain and suffering
damages in wrongful death cases in Taiwan. Our empirical findings will be of relief to
other East Asian countries such as China where assessments of pain and suffering damages
in wrongful death cases are generally not formulaic. On the other hand, the predictability
of nonpecuniary damages by regression models points toward a new reform approach:
making pain and suffering damages predictable by suggesting or mandating judges to use
the point estimates with prediction intervals by regression models as the starting point of
the judicial award.
There are limits to our data and analysis, and future research is thus warranted. This
study focuses on car accidents, a typical negligent tort case; future research on intentional
torts such as battery may show a different picture. Certain potentially normatively important
factors, such as the incomes and assets of both parties and the victim, their educational
level, and so forth are not always available from the written judgments; thus, our study is not
able to include them in the regression models. A joint research project with courts in
Taiwan in the future may better pin down the determinants of nonpecuniary damages.
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